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Abstract 
 
Complex dynamical systems (CDS) are providing a new way of understanding nature. 
Complexity needs the interplay of different levels in reality and a redefinition of the 
epistemic approaches in the transition from lower to upper levels. Traditionally, the 
concept of emergence has tried to bring together the philosophical explanations for the 
differentiation and crossover between levels. However, it is highly controversial whether 
emergence is merely epistemic or truly ontic. In this article, I present the philosophical 
challenges posed by the emergence of CDS regarding conventional epistemic 
reductionism. I make a strong case for ontic emergence and, therefore, an ontologically 
plural universe focusing on three conundrums of current Science: the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics, and the symbol 
grounding problem. I conclude that all of them are interwoven, point towards rejection 
of naturalistic monism, and suggest the presence of a transcendent logos in nature. 
 
Keywords: entropy, Quantum Mechanics, symbol grounding problem, CDS, ontological 
pluralism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature on complex dynamical systems (CDS) is nowadays 
providing a new paradigm for understanding nature, as human beings perceive it. 
Even if a straightforward definition of CDS is hard to find, I will tentatively 
characterize them as open systems: (1) consisting of at least two distinct levels 
of description — that I label micro and macro — which remain highly correlated 
at the same time; (2) whose available phase-space at the micro level is restricted 
to a tiny specific region — thus being far from thermal equilibrium; and (3) 
possessing some emergent properties that cannot be predicated upon any of their 
subsystems. In the essence of this novel conceptualization of entities stands the 
interplay between different levels of reality defining the way in which specific 
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systems are being looked at. In some sense this is not surprising. In our everyday 
experience, we humans deal with different protocols in order to access reality. 
We behave differently when dealing with stones, plants, animals, single 
human beings or societies. The world we inhabit seems to be composed of 
different interrelated levels of organization. But, from a realist point of view, are 
those levels ontologically distinct (theory-independent) or are they related to our 
species-dependent way of knowing? 
For CDS enthusiasts, Biology could involve many critical networks, 
nestled together in hierarchies that generate ever more complex phenomena. But 
is this emergence of complexity truly real? Supporters of ontological 
reductionism claim that it is not — complexity being either an illusion or 
epiphenomenal, i.e. reducible to more basic constituents of nature. Whereas this 
view is compatible with the aforementioned multilevel experience, it assumes a 
perfect many-to-one correspondence between a specific level and its immediate 
upper level. The relationship between the former and the latter is statistics. 
Ontological reductionism thus allows for a compatibilist view of epistemically 
different levels of knowledge. For instance, there is no contradiction between the 
use of the concept of free will and the fact that our behaviour arises from the 
movement of the molecules of our body, which could be, at the molecular level, 
perfectly deterministic [C. Rovelli, Free Will, Determinism, Quantum Theory 
and Statistical Fluctuations: A Physicists' Take, in Edge, 2013, http://edge.org/ 
conversation/free-will-determinism-quantum-theory-and-statistical-fluctuations-
a-physicists-take]. A sort of coarse-graining procedure in the phase-space of 
finest levels‘ available states should allow the univocal epistemic building up of 
upper levels‘ states. Since ontological reductionism tends to consider the basic 
building blocks of nature as fundamental, the many-to-one correspondence 
means that fine-grained levels are necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
emergence of coarse-grained levels. It is a layered view of nature. ―The world is 
divided into discrete strata, with fundamental Physics as the base level, followed 
by Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology (and possibly Sociology).‖ [1] 
While the literature on the emergence of complexity has extensively 
debated this issue, it has rarely focused on specific gaps which, at our present 
scientific knowledge, do not allow the applicability of ontological reductionism. 
The main goal of this paper is to present three of these gaps that, in my opinion, 
should be explained away by the reductionist party lest its claim become flawed. 
The paper is organized as follows: first, I shall briefly introduce the main 
philosophical views regarding the emergence phenomenon; I shall discuss later 
the epistemic and ontic relevance of the three gaps precluding ontological 
reductionism; finally, I present some concluding remarks that explain why it is 
highly unlikely that, even though the three actual gaps are explained, ontological 
reductionism might get rid of future gaps and become a plausible view of reality. 
All this suggests that human access to reality has some intrinsic, ontologically 
grounded limits that, notwithstanding, permit real knowledge and, even more 
importantly, that nature is laden with both an inner and transcendent logos. 
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2 .  Kinds of emergence 
 
When one speaks of complexity of a particular natural system, one refers 
to a system being studied under at least two different viewpoints, namely, one 
micro and one macro-level perspective. These two perspectives are connected in 
the sense of being correlated at the same time. The integrity and identity of a 
complex system are therefore fundamentally related to dynamical connectivity 
among its parts [2]. For example, when a living organism is considered to be 
complex, we assume that at its macroscopic level it consists of a very specific set 
of microstates — usually an attractor in phase-space — among the pool of 
microstates that would in principle be accessible were it in thermal equilibrium. 
A defining characteristic of CDS is therefore being far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium. 
Roughly speaking, we can distinguish two broad understandings of 
emergent entities (properties or substances) arising out of more fundamental 
entities and yet novel or irreducible with respect to them: (a) epistemological 
emergence, which reflects the unpredictable macroscopic outcomes of the 
world‘s dynamics and focus on diachronic relationships between matter in pre- 
and post-complexity stages, regardless the metaphysical origin of macroscopic 
unpredictability; and (b) ontological emergence, which involves the appearance 
of primitive high-level causal interactions that are additional to those of the more 
fundamental levels. Each new layer is a consequence of the appearance of an 
interacting range of novel qualities [1]. 
Whereas epistemological emergence judges emergent properties as 
explanatory relevant but epiphenomenal, ontological emergence implies 
downward causation from upper levels to lower ones. Some epistemological 
emergentists deem it possible to represent novel macroscopic phenomena within 
a more comprehensive physical theory. Then, we need only augment the theory 
to include variables for the precise structural conditions in which the novel 
phenomena occur. However, the instrumentalist flavour of such prescription is 
evident since it says nothing regarding the fundamentality of the levels of 
description. On the other hand, it is unclear whether all emergent phenomena 
can be phrased in terms of degrees of freedom of the same pre-defined basic 
level. 
Whether there are any instances of ontological emergence and the way in 
which emergent properties might consistently covariate with fundamental 
properties at the basal level is highly controversial at present. However, well-
known scientists have pointed out the existence of ‗protected‘ properties, e.g. the 
Quantum Hall and the Josephson Effect that are well understood in terms of high 
level principles and cannot be deduced from microscopic laws. They are true and 
lead to exact results even irrespective of the eventual Theory of Everything 
(TOE) at play [1]. ―Emergent universality causes sample variations and 
imperfections to heal away as the size grows.‖ [3] In this article, I strongly make 
the case for ontological emergence and downward causation in nature. If that is 
the case, ontological emergence and downward causation must be taken into 
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account in order to improve our scientific knowledge of the (allegedly) most 
fundamental levels of reality. 
 
3. Top-down causality in complex dynamical systems 
 
Can we identify CDS in light of their evolutionary capacity? Since CDS‘s 
identity must include both their dynamic etiology and their potential, how are we 
to address the problem of identity as permanence with respect to them? A new 
way of conceptualizing the emergence of complexity seems unavoidable, 
according to which boundaries of dynamical systems are best conceptualized as 
sites of phase changes where a different phase portrait can suddenly appear. 
CDS are the (not spatial but dynamical) locus of emergent properties [2], in 
which the novelty defines the system and its degrees of freedom. The 
mechanical paradigm of defining the phase space for the whole problem a priori 
is no longer valid [4]. 
On the other hand, there seems to be a true downward causation of top-
level constraints on the evolution of some CDS. Somehow, these constraints act 
as a self-tuning tool, functionally contextualizing the system‘s dynamics [5]. The 
emergent higher level phenomena exert top-down influence on the very 
components that make them up [6-8]. But is it truly ontological causation? 
Juarrero explains how context-sensitive constraints embody changes in 
probability distributions of the underlying microstates and, somehow, create 
information. In the system, the set of available microstates is narrowed down at 
the lower level while a new set of available macrostates appears at an upper 
level. Complexification creates heretofore nonexistent possibilities and new 
directions for the system. Top-down causality is thus ―a process of selection, a 
kind of semiosis that interprets — from the point of view and for the benefit of 
the higher level whole — which among all the possible component addition, 
deletion, or replacement alternatives best satisfies the requirements of the higher 
level‖ [7]. Does it mean an alteration of the underlying physical process? It does 
in the sense of modifying the accessible phase space, creating attractors and 
making overall non-ergodic the initially non-constrained dynamics. 
Nevertheless, there still seems to be some problems regarding the 
definition of constraints and top-down causality. Juarrero deems constraints to 
be ―relational properties that parts acquire in virtue of being unified—not just 
aggregated — into a systematic whole‖ [6]. But who or what decides on the 
actual presence of a systematic whole? Conditions for the emergence of CDS are 
equally ambiguous, ―a complex dynamical system emerges when the behavior of 
each molecule suddenly depends both on what the neighboring molecules are 
doing and on what went before‖ [6]. But, in general, that occurs in many-body 
systems that need not be complex like, e.g. gases in a volume. 
Obviously, the interplay between hierarchical levels is essential in order to 
understand CDS. The evolutionary advantage of such systematic hierarchical 
differentiation is that the whole can access states that the independent parts 
cannot, introducing true novelty in nature. These phase changes are in principle 
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unpredictable; the only way to explain them is with a retrospective narrative that 
retraces the actual leap [6]. But this also means that we should rethink our 
understanding of scientific knowledge, since it presents intrinsic limitations. A 
new philosophy of science must confront the investigation of the role played by 
constraints, perturbations and symmetry breaking processes in nature. For the 
time being, CDS point towards a shift to narrative hermeneutics as scientific 
explanation. Narrative interpretation is the best available explanation, not 
deduction, because of the historicity of the interpreter and of the facts. Phase 
changes embody essentially incompressible information, i.e. there exists no law 
or algorithm more concise than the process itself that can capture and describe 
what happened [6]. As a matter of fact, there are some basic laws of the universe 
that only are unraveled to us via history. 
 
4. Can physics-laden evolution be a complete theory? 
 
Since we are mainly interested in the emergence of complexity, one 
possible question is whether this phenomenon might be purely explained in 
terms of evolution. The evolutionary framework should eventually explain all 
the bottom-up processes responsible of the emerging complexity. Nevertheless, 
in real life, the reference of any scientific theory to epistemic levels whose 
interconnection is far from trivial makes this route extremely impractical. For 
instance, all predictive models that we know deal with a ‗physics in a box‘ 
situation [9], where the world is split into a dynamical system and a static 
environment which serves as a generalized boundary condition for tackling the 
problem. Would we have obtained similar results had the partition been made 
differently? It is highly unclear whether our actual knowledge is able to account 
for the identity of complex adaptive processes. More work is needed in 
fundamental Physics and a TOE before claiming that evolution theory can 
explain nature from scratch. 
Scientific study of CDS poses serious challenges to the mainstream view 
of evolution theory. Since we cannot predict necessary and sufficient causes that 
achieve an adaptation, we cannot have an efficient cause law for how the 
adaptation will eventually be achieved. Biological adaptations suggest a process 
that is ―both partially beyond sufficient efficient cause natural law, yet, 
importantly, very much context dependent and non-random‖ [S.A. Kauffman, 
Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind, Edge, 2009, https://edge.org/ 
conversation/five-problems-in-the-philosophy-of-mind]. The biosphere is 
continually searching for new structures of increasing complexity depending on 
its actual state and its adjacent possibilities of actualization in new upper levels. 
The history of the cosmos thus appears to be interspersed with the onset of 
specific context constraints, enabling the emergence of complex structures as 
stars, living and intelligent beings. Constraints suppress part of the underlying 
phase-space, break its symmetry, and organize it differently. The lesson to be 
learned is that every time a new complex structure emerges, a sort of phase-
transition is happening anew, which cannot be described with the degrees of 
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freedom corresponding to the former situation. A new conceptualization is 
needed [10]. A new set of degrees of freedom comes to the fore that turns out to 
be as fundamental as those of the lower levels. 
In words of Hermann Weyl, ―the truth as we see it today is this: The laws 
of nature do not determine uniquely the one world that actually exists‖ [11]. 
Conditions at the lowest levels are not necessary, because one could eventually 
reproduce the upper levels with different ingredients (just think about a 
computer working with water instead of electricity). We can have the same 
software with different hardware. But more importantly, conditions at the lowest 
level are not sufficient either. As far as I know, we need at least to invoke three 
irreducible procedures to retrieve the classical world from the microscopic 
physical realm: the Second Law of Thermodynamics (linked to the arrow of 
time); the quantum wave-function reduction (irrespective of whether using 
decoherence or consciousness direct causation) and the emergence of 
information. I shall study all of them and their interconnectedness more in detail 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
5. The difficulties with entropy 
 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of a closed 
system is a non-decreasing function of (increasing) time. Since time and entropy 
increase in parallel, it is commonly accepted that entropy signals the arrow of 
time in the Universe. Quite paradoxically, the Second Law cannot be deduced 
from the fundamental laws of Physics because of the latter‘s symmetry in time. 
We do not have yet a commonly-accepted fundamental theory explaining the 
origin of time-reversal symmetry breaking. 
There is a certain amount of subjectivity in the definition of entropy, 
which involves a fuzzy distinction between micro and macrostates. However, 
this physical concept is extraordinarily robust for calculations when the 
Boltzmann‘s definition is used, due to the overall huge phase-space volumes 
involved in defining macrostates and especially the thermal state. ―These 
enormous factors reveal a remarkable fact about our universe that does seem to 
be clearly objective and ‗out there‘ (…) despite the admittedly confusing issues 
of subjectivity that are involved in our concept of ‗entropy‘, these serving 
merely to cloud the central mystery that underlines the profound usefulness of 
this remarkable physical notion.‖ [12] 
Admittedly, the recourse to entropy is not always necessary to solve a 
physical problem. But it is when non-equilibrium Thermodynamics is at play —
as the case turns out to be with CDS. Understanding Thermodynamics just from 
a statistical point of view misses the critical point signaled by ‗non-equilibrium‘ 
Physics. Since fundamental microscopic laws refer to microstates, they do not 
favor any particular macrostate. They are blind regarding the latter. But they are 
also blind regarding the arrow of time, which seems to have different status from 
the rest of spatial dimensions featuring the Universe. Actually, the Second Law 
is a consequence of an initial state of the universe having an extremely low 
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entropy [13, 14], independently of any psychological argument. The very fact 
that entropy is increasing depends upon the actuality of one end ―of the 
evolution curve in phase space being constrained to a very tiny coarse-graining 
region, and this is the case for only a very minute fraction of possible universe 
histories. It is the very tininess of the coarse-graining region (…) that our 
evolution curve appears to have encountered that needs explaining.‖ [12, p. 53] 
Smolin presses the argument up to the point of making time the central 
notion to understand the behavior of the Universe. Even the laws of nature 
should evolve over time. If everything can be connected to everything else, there 
must be a global time. Space itself could be epiphenomenal, but time has to be 
real. The arrow of time is marked by this long-lasting non-equilibrium universe 
whose mathematical description is time-asymmetric. ―These properties are 
extraordinarily unlikely, were the solution that describes our universe to be 
picked randomly.‖ [9, p. 203] Statistics cannot be the explanation because of the 
well-known Boltzmann brain paradox, i.e. evolution is statistically less likely 
than the random emergence of brains were the former a sheer fluctuation of a 
universe overall in equilibrium. 
One possible line of research is the anti-thermodynamic nature of gravity, 
which could be related to the principle of driven self-organization invoked by 
Smolin and Kauffman when dealing with CDS. Contrary to what happens with 
other fundamental interactions, the coalescence of massive objects because of 
gravity increases their entropy; black holes being the most entropic objects in the 
Universe [12, p. 75; 14, p. 715]. On the other hand, phenomena of life and 
consciousness seem to be related to high-dimensional patterns and attractors in 
phase-space that lower local entropy [7]. Whatever the case, on every scale and 
at every level of complexity, time is fundamental and the future is open. The 
Second Law of Thermodynamics implies a ‗subjective‘ distinction of micro and 
macrostates in the system and a selection of perspective according to which the 
relevant magnitudes for the problem are defined. Until today, this law is 
fundamental and purports the inescapable conclusion — even for multiverse 
approaches — that ―the initial conditions of our Universe appear to have been 
finely tuned to produce a Universe that is asymmetric in time‖ [9, p. 206]. Of 
course, a multiverse picture with an anthropic principle in order to choose the 
right initial conditions may be invoked, but such argument risks circularity. In 
Tegmark‘s words, after trying to explain the quantum factorization and the 
consciousness problems ‗from scratch‘, either the initial conditions (described 
by the initial density matrix of the Universe) or the dynamics (described by the 
Hamiltonian) are ‗special‘ [M. Tegmark, Consciousness as a State of Matter,  
arXiv:1401.1219 [quant-ph], 2014, http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219]. 
 
6. Quantum physics and the emergence of the ‘classical world’ 
 
The characteristic interplay between micro and macrostates for CDS turns 
out to be characteristic for the entropy problem and also for the emergence of the 
‗classical‘ word in quantum mechanics (QM). As it is well-known, standard 
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interpretation of QM basically considers two different processes: the 
deterministic, predictable and computable evolution of the wave-function 
according to the Schrödinger equation, once the initial conditions have been 
settled; and the indeterministic, unpredictable and non-computable wave-
function collapse after a measurement into one of the possible outcomes 
regarding that specific measurement — then becoming an actual event in the 
‗emerging classic world‘. How can the discontinuous and probabilistic wave-
function collapse come about as a result of the interaction (measurement) 
between two parts of the physical reality? This is the QM measurement paradox. 
Quantum entanglement among different classical possibilities — which can no 
longer be separated — is responsible for exotic interference patterns, wave-like 
behaviours of particles in our classical world. There are top-down influences of 
the globally entangled wave-function onto its local parts — which do not assume 
an individuation or localization independent of the whole — determining both 
the possible results of specific measurements and the emergence of a well-
defined physical reality (having classical physical properties). The process of 
decoherence is currently the favourite physical model to explain the transition 
from the quantum world of possibilities to the classical world of actual 
events [15]. Interaction of the quantum system with its environment somehow 
acts like a classical measuring device: the system is ‗partially measured‘ by its 
environment hence the gradual onset of decoherence leading the system into a 
classical mixed state of classical probabilities, not quantum possibilities that 
superimpose [https://edge.org/conversation/five-problems-in-the-philosophy-of-
mind]. This is sufficient to obtain classical statistical predictions that can be 
successfully tested, but does not obviously solve the fundamental problem of 
why dealing differently with the system and the environment [14, p. 803; 16], 
nor the problem of ontological indeterminism in nature‘s fundamental levels. 
 
6.1. The problem of decoherence 
 
Whereas recourse to decoherence initially avoids invoking consciousness 
to solve the measurement paradox of QM and points to breaking the link 
between human consciousness and the wave-function‘s collapse [17], it leaves 
untouched the problem of decoherence itself, merely postponing the influence of 
the conscious observer in selecting the relevant variables of the problem [16]. 
More importantly, the task of identifying a system by the observer is non-
computable. An observation is a process of decoherence that occurs when the 
Kolmogorov complexity of at least one of the systems involved approaches the 
Kolmogorov complexity of the external observer. But, in general, Kolmogorov 
complexity is not computable and, therefore, non-algorithmic. This suggests that 
quantum mechanical systems exist only with respect to a particular class of 
observers, whose task of system identification is prior to QM itself [18]. 
Zurek argues in favour of an einselection of a preferred basis (of 
observables) by the environment. The criteria for such a procedure would be 
minimization of entropy in the information transfer between the different 
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systems involved and maximization of stability along time, in a sort of Quantum 
Darwinism [19]. The predictability sieve shows that only quantum states that are 
robust in spite of decoherence (and effectively ‗classical‘) have predictable 
consequences. Classical reality would be equivalent to predictability; therefore, 
the predictability sieve would have been extremely useful in evolution, allowing 
forecasts about upcoming states of the world [15]. However, since the 
ontological features of the state vectors are acquired through the epistemological 
information transfer of einselection, we are still left with essential questions 
about the ontological character of information and entropy, and of the splitting 
between system and environment; not to mention the problem of indeterminism 
at the fundamental level as Zurek himself acknowledges. 
Modal interpretations of QM, for their part, still have a problem with the a 
priori decomposition of system and environment. But, even more, since modal 
interpretations supply actualization rules that pick out from the set of all 
observables of a quantum system the subset of definite-valued properties making 
it possible to derive rigorous results [20], further cognitive prescriptions must be 
added to the theory. In the consistent histories approach, on the other hand, the 
situation is not better: there is no criterion by which certain consistent coarse-
grained histories are preferred over others that might be equally consistent [21]. 
In other words, a prescription on how to go from the wave-function to the 
measured-value state is always needed. If both of these states are ontological —
and the effect of quantum interference is strong enough evidence to support such 
view — fundamental cognitive prescriptions seems to be unavoidable in order to 
explain the link between these two levels of reality. Despite the efforts of the 
Quantum Darwinism program [19], the origin of classicality still depends on 
definitions of observation and communication [22]. 
 
6.2. Quantum mechanics and logic 
 
In a recent book, Epperson and Zafiris claim, from a Whiteheadian 
perspective, that logic is irreducible to Physics and clarify the ontological 
function of logic in quantum causality, thanks to the Boolean contextual basis of 
particular quantum measurements [21, p. 158; 23]. In that sense, the act of 
observation is generative of novel facts, not merely revelatory of pre-existing 
facts — as stated by hidden variables theories. Evaluation and contextualization 
are deemed ontologically relational features of actuality and potentiality in the 
world, mediating logic the transition from the latter to the former and vice versa. 
Moreover, the usual set theoretic framework for QM should then be replaced by 
a category (sheaf-) theoretic framework capable of maintaining topological 
correlations that are global. Since ‗system‘, ‗detector‘, and ‗environment‘ are 
always formally entangled in QM, such that their partitioning is intrinsically 
relative [24], ―quantum mechanical relations between measured system and 
environment cannot be characterized as purely efficient causal relations‖. 
Decoherence ―makes sense only as an intrinsic, locally conceived, reductive 
process of the global-level description of a quantum system‖, and the classical 
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world ―emerges intrinsically from the global quantum level via coarsening the 
scale of resolution of quantum observable behavior by means of macroscopic 
Boolean observables locally according to the sheaf-theoretic topological 
compatibility relation‖ [21, p. 351]. 
As said by these authors, ―all causal relationships presuppose logical 
relationships, and logical relationships can have physical significance‖ because 
the ―classical (merely epistemic) conception of conditional probabilities is 
entirely invalid in QM‖. The ―ontological interpretation of QM depicts logical 
correlations as a physical significant feature of nature itself‖. The significance of 
this perspective for CDS is straightforward, for the reason that quantum 
entanglement ―precludes in a novel way the possibility of defining individual 
entities independently of the local logical frames (Boolean frames) under which 
their behavior is manifested‖. Each ―higher level totality contains and is thus 
conditioned by the facts of the next lowest level, and so on down the series of 
inclusions‖ and ―every becoming actual occasion/propositional predicative fact 
is always internally related to a global, objective actual world — an actual 
system of facts with objective truth values‖ [21, p. 142]. In short, our epistemic 
access to the universe is grounded on a prior logical hierarchy of levels 
continually coming into being in a generative process. 
QM touches upon the logical order of nature and descends deeper than the 
causal order of nature. There ―exists a mutually implicative bidirectional relation 
between the parts and the whole, where the correlation of potentialities plays a 
crucial role‖ [23, p. 358]. But then, we assist to the coup de grâce to any 
reductive interpretation of emergence. The realm of potentialities has an inner 
logos which commensurates with our human logos. Somehow, in a very subtle 
manner, logic shapes the world. For instance, the existence of non-
commutativity relations between specific pairs of observables — canonical 
conjugates of each other —means that there is an intrinsic order in the Universe. 
This order is not naïve. It always plays its part at the level of correlations of 
potentialities and, noteworthily, after a specific measurement context has been 
devised, i.e. after localization of the global quantum event. This order (induced 
by non-commutativity) is present everywhere and is responsible in last term of 
the novel quantum effects. Non-commutativity is a logical relation that cannot 
be emergent, but primary. The obvious question now is, why can this objective 
logos be experienced subjectively? Why does consciousness appear in the 
world? 
 
6.3. Quantum mechanics and information 
 
The QM mysteries also bring up the question: Why is the Universe 
favourable to consciousness? [25] Out of all of the possible factorizations of 
Hilbert space, why is the particular factorization corresponding to classical space 
— as we humans perceive it — so special? Why do we perceive our world as a 
hierarchy of objects that are strongly integrated and relatively independent? Max 
Tegmark tries to understand consciousness as a state of matter (‗perceptronium‘) 
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characterized by the principles of storage capacity of integrated information, 
autonomy (independence and complex dynamics), and utility. In his ‗physics-
from-scratch‘ approach, the maximization of integrated information in the 
human brain — especially from the QM perspective — or the decomposition of 
the Universe into maximally independent objects presents, paradoxically, 
meagre results. The definition of integrated information must be modified or 
supplemented by additional principles related to information processing in 
autonomous systems. Tegmark is confident of the existence of some optimal 
factorization of our universe into integrated and relatively independent parts that 
explains what ―conscious observers perceive, because an integrated and 
relatively autonomous information complex is fundamentally what a conscious 
observer is‖ [http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219]. 
In accordance with Zurek‘s results for the privileged basis, the states that 
are most robust toward environment-induced decoherence are those that 
approximately commute with the interaction Hamiltonian. Such states dominate 
Quantum Darwinism‘s survival of the fittest by multiplying their imprints in the 
environment — which thereby shapes how decoherence to classicity occurs for 
all practical purposes [https://edge.org/conversation/five-problems-in-the-
philosophy-of-mind]. The utility principle, on the other hand, suggests that it is 
precisely these most stable and predictable states that conscious observers will 
perceive. However, when studying autonomy from scratch, the state of the 
system and its dynamics (its density matrix and the Hamiltonian) cannot be 
considered separately, their interplay being crucial. Moreover, work on Quantum 
Darwinism has shown that a ―state selected at random from the Hilbert space of 
a many-body system is overwhelmingly likely to exhibit highly non-classical 
correlations (…). The objectivity of classical reality — the fact that multiple 
observers can agree on the state of a subsystem after measuring just a small 
fraction of its environment — implies that the correlations found in nature 
between macroscopic systems and their environments are exceptional.‖ [26] 
In summary, the particular Hilbert space factorization we observe is very 
special and unique, since there are countless other Hilbert space factorizations 
that mix the system and the environment. Either the system state is special or the 
Hamiltonian is special. On the other hand, Tegmark points out that ―the optimal 
factorization can change at least somewhat with time, since our designation of 
objects is temporary (…). An obvious way out of this impasse is to bring 
consciousness back to center-stage‖. ―It therefore appears that if we can one day 
solve the quantum factorization problem, then we will find that the emergence of 
time is linked to the emergence of consciousness‖. Conscious observation needs 
to be taken into account to address the issue properly. We ―need a criterion for 
identifying conscious observers, and then a prescription that determines which 
factorization each of them will perceive‖ [http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219]. 
Conscious human observers perceive the world in a species-specific way, so that 
the physics-from-scratch approach fails, being a too fine-grained level that 
misses the point of human symmetry breaking. One needs something more at an 
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upper level; one needs to invoke the level of human beings interested in relevant 
information from the system in order to solve specific problems. 
As far as we know, consciousness distinguishes available and relevant 
information for the subject, using top-down causation at different levels [27]. 
This selection process, typical of CDS, is obvious insofar as ―mental states, 
whatever we mean by that and whatever the amount of information they imply, 
contain immensely less information than the information necessary to determine 
the full physical state of the brain‖ [http://edge.org/conversation/free-will-
determinism-quantum-theory-and-statistical-fluctuations-a-physicists-take]. 
Even if QM ―describes a universe in which you can make probabilistic 
predictions of how systems behave, but in which those systems have as much 
freedom from determinism as any physical system described by probabilities can 
have‖ [9, p. 150], nature itself somehow asks for a conscious observer at the end 
of the determination process. In addition, the ―need to refer to consciousness 
exists, insofar as only consciousness can distinguish a mere physical correlation, 
e.g. of an external system with the observer‘s eye, from actually available 
information, i.e. such that the observer is aware of, and can act upon in the 
future‖. This means that ―that information is a correlation between the degrees of 
freedom of the observed and observing systems‖ [18]. We humans being, from 
the point of view of Physics, CDS far from equilibrium is a situation clearly 
favourable to information processing at different levels. But, what exactly is this 
‗relative‘ concept of information? 
 
7. Information-laden Nature 
 
Is information everywhere in nature independently of conscious observers 
(metaphysical monism of it from bit)? Does this concept reduce to a causality 
relation or to a correlation between physical magnitudes whenever a cognitive 
agent is absent? Is information a special interface between the universe and its 
inhabitants, with QM as a theory of physical information? Floridi, from his 
philosophy-of-information approach, offers a valid definition of semantic 
information as ―well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data; knowledge is 
relevant semantic information properly accounted for; humans are the only 
known semantic engines and conscious inforgs (informational organisms) in the 
universe who can develop a growing knowledge of reality; and reality is the 
totality of information (notice the crucial absence of ‗semantic‘)‖. In the same 
vein, information ―is not about representing the world: it is rather a means to 
model it in such a way as to make sense of it and withstand its impact‖ [28]. 
Therefore, whereas information pervades reality, relevant semantic information 
is only proper to human beings. What does it mean? 
 
7.1.  Knowledge as ‘accounted-for’ information 
 
Questions about how can raw data acquire their meaning or how 
meaningful data acquire their truth value then arise. As a matter of fact, a datum 
 
Entropy, Quantum mechanics, and information in complex systems 
 
  
29 
 
is ultimately reducible to some ‗lack of uniformity‘, but data must be accessed 
and elaborated by an information agent with finality, within some context and 
defined level of abstraction. Truth is encapsulated in information providing 
distal access to, successful interaction with the modelled system. On the other 
hand, Floridi defends a subjectivist interpretation of epistemic relevance: no 
―semantic information is relevant per se, relevance being an informee-oriented 
concept (…). More explicitly, this means grounding relations of causal relevance 
on relations of epistemic relevance‖. But this subjectivist interpretation of 
relevant information cannot obviously work for artificial agents, nor for 
differentiating a lucky informee from a knower [28, p. 267]. Knowledge implies 
correctly accounting for how come questions about the available information. 
Being informed that you are mistaken is different from knowing why you 
are [29]. Knowledge — especially scientific knowledge — requires the 
embedding of information in a network of relevant questions and correct 
answers; an account in which each piece of information is relevant. In that sense, 
knowledge is intentional and needs a coherent explanatory history behind it. 
Accounting for relevant information allows a graded appraisal of 
epistemic states, as it occurs with scientific knowledge. On the other hand, even 
if non-human animals do not hold explicit accounts for their information, they 
do possess sensitive knowledge and implicit accounts of their information 
embedded in their life time span. All in all, ‗knowing that‘ ―is grounded on 
‗knowing how‘, hardly surprising from an evolutionary perspective‖ [28, p. 
287]. Nevertheless, as Floridi recognizes, the sceptical problem remains. He 
explains what knowledge is, but not how to obtain that knowledge in specific 
situations. His model turns out to be a pragmatic theory of truth. But a more 
fundamental theory of truth is needed because there is no normativity in the pure 
neuronal processes underlying, e.g. mathematical and logical judgments [30]. 
Both a constitutive and a historical explanation of knowledge are needed [31]. 
 
7.2.  Consciousness and knowledge 
 
The capability of accounting for relevant information seems to disclose an 
innate power of conscious observers to process whatever kind of information. At 
the same time, it gives us a hint on what consciousness is. Whereas externally 
inferable states do not allow us to discriminate between types of inferential 
agents — what casts serious questions on Turing test‘s significance to determine 
conscious beings — conscious agents can be distinguished from artificial agents 
and zombies thanks to their ability to exploit the information implicit in 
questions addressed to them and in their own answers. A ―zombie can jump and 
walk but he cannot infer (let alone be certain) from this that he exists, for he 
does nor (indeed cannot) know that he himself is jumping and walking‖ [28, p. 
304]. Dealing with information is therefore different from ‗knowing that‘. This 
subjective processing of information needs consciousness; it is present conscious 
knowledge that transcends time. Consciousness allows for true knowledge about 
reality beyond time. 
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Floridi shows how extracting relevant semantic information from self-
answering questions about one‘s particular states requires agents endowed with 
advanced semantic capacities in a sort of ‗transcendental thinking‘; thinking 
about the conditions of possibility of the very answer. A ―self-answering 
question requires both understanding of the content of, and a detachment from, 
the question itself. Self-answering questions are part of the frame problem.‖ [28, 
p. 305] Human agents, different from artificial machines and zombies, have a 
position in the world because they do possess an identity which shapes their 
relationships with the Universe. They are in the world as here-now oriented 
subjects [32] not objects. Knowledge is thus inseparable of ‗I know‘ statements. 
Subjective reflection requires not only semantics, but also consciousness; an 
overall capacity of reflectivity that, in the case of artificial agents and zombies, 
cannot be predefined. Even though reflective knowledge never comes to a halt 
— I can always know that I know that I know… — it is enough for qualifying 
human consciousness. 
Remarkably, Floridi compares consciousness to a mathematical fixed 
point in an abstract phase space: ―it occurs as a decoupling from reality and a 
collapsing of the referring agent and the referred agent‖ [28, p. 314]. A new limit 
is then reached in nature. From the point of view of CDS, this fact points toward 
the emergence of the level of consciousness and raises strong doubts about its 
reconciliation with some form of naturalism. In spite of Searle‘s strong 
commitment in favour of the possibility of an objective account of 
consciousness [30, p. 114], the ontology of the mental seems to be an irreducibly 
first-person ontology. 
 
7.3.  The symbol grounding problem 
 
Whereas we do not know of the existence of real zombies, we know of 
everyday artificial agents capable of handling information. Is it possible to 
coordinate several artificial agents to obtain semantic systems? Is there any 
possibility to attach meaning to symbols from scratch? Searle clearly points out 
that neither semantics nor syntax in computation are intrinsic properties of the 
grounding Physics. Both of them need an external interpretation [30, p. 17]. 
Nevertheless, Floridi attempts to unravel this problem searching for an 
interpretation of the symbols intrinsic to the symbol system itself, which should 
be able to generate its meaningful elements. The solution, however, cannot be 
grounded in any form of representationalism, semirepresentationalism or non-
representationalism, which do not satisfy the ‗zero semantic commitment 
condition‘. All of them surreptitiously introduce pre-established criteria, hard-
coded by a supervisor, for categorizing the world [28, p. 139-140]. 
Since specific meaning can hardly be acquired in isolation or 
independently of context, level of abstraction and purpose parameters, one clue 
for the possible solution stems from posing the question of how a primitive, 
simple, and initial form of intentionality develops (in an autonomous way) from 
the direct interactions between an artificial agent and its environment. Artificial 
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evolutionism always presumes the presence of a semantic framework from the 
programmer to the ‗right‘ fitness. On the contrary, Floridi invokes ‗action-based 
semantics‘ (AbS) as an explanation of the particular process that allows the 
coupling of symbols to meanings. In AbS, artificial agents should relate their 
symbols to the states in which they are placed by the actions that they perform. 
The initial association of symbols and meanings is a direct input-output relation 
that follows only from the performance of actions. However, the critical issue is 
that AbS needs a system capable of ‗metaprogramming‘, operating at two levels 
interacting with each other: ―It organizes actions at an object level, where it 
interacts with the external environment. But it can also take actions on its 
internal states and on its own elaborations. In this case, it operates at a meta-
level, which takes as data the actions at the object level.‖ [28, p. 166] 
Even if this metaprogramming paradigm is highly suggestive —
resembling a proposed partition of brain linguistic functions [33] — it seems to 
beg the question in different ways: (a) it is unclear whether the input/output 
structure of data, as well as the concept of internal state, can be well-defined 
‗from scratch‘, as it is grounded in a system/environment partition which is not 
fundamental; (b) the transition from an analogical external universe to a discrete 
world of internal states requires a new, upper, coarse-grained level of 
abstraction; (c) since the meta-level operation is reserved to a ‗part‘ of the 
system, it must be a somehow hardwired functional process, directly following 
from the part‘s particular physical evolution, embodiment in the system and 
overall survival [28, p. 172]. However, it cannot be simply assumed that a new 
level of abstraction stems from the physics, because this is precisely what is at 
stake. It is hard to speak about levels of abstraction without reference to human 
interpretation. 
Whereas association processes following Hebb‘s rule are very likely 
playing a role in learning processes and social pressure must be the main 
influence on communication tuning, avoiding the problem of a private language, 
Floridi does not overcome Wittgensteinian criticism related to meaning-as-use. 
Intrinsic flaws of his metaprogramming approach beg the question about why 
the association of a symbol with an internal state of the system is a meaning. 
Most interestingly, the perspective of CDS support the view that meaning cannot 
be accessed algorithmically and requires a non-algorithmic shift of inter-level, 
cognitive strategy, namely, a simplification of the relevant degrees of freedom to 
attain stability in the deterministic chaos province of neurons and the 
minimization of information loss [34]. In brief, swap of information is needed to 
obtain a new meaningful level of abstraction. 
 
7.4.  Consciousness as integrated information? 
 
According to Tononi‘s recent approach, consciousness is one and the 
same thing as integrated information; it exists as a fundamental quantity whose 
quality is completely and univocally given by the informational relationships 
generated by a complex of elements. Integrated information is above and beyond 
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the information generated independently by the parts of a system and turns out to 
be ‗intrinsic‘ to the system [35]. But how is that possible, since information must 
be ‗interpreted nature‘? One never deals with pure data, but with interpreted 
data [28, p. 356]. 
Integrated information should therefore be evaluated from the perspective 
of the system itself, starting from its elementary, indivisible components and 
interactions, and not by arbitrarily imposing ‗units‘ from the perspective of an 
observer. But then again, are all systems not observer-dependent? For Tononi, 
―there will often be a privileged spatio-temporal ‗grain size‘ at which a given 
system forms a complex of highest integrated information — the spatiotemporal 
scale at which it ‗exists‘ the most in terms of integrated information, and 
therefore of consciousness‖ [35]. In that sense, consciousness would emerge as a 
most basic informative, spatio-temporal property, linked to the deepest mysteries 
of the universe. However, it is highly controversial as to why and how a 
particular content of consciousness, or quale, must be ascribed to a particular set 
of physical causal connections. Tononi‘s hypothesis does not touch upon the 
question of the origin of meaning; it simply imposes the identification by fiat of 
a plausible correlation between qualia and integrated information. 
 
7.5.  Information and mind 
 
What we learn from all these approaches is that the polarity between 
ontology and epistemology seems to be irreducible. Reality is informational 
because it consists of differences, or inequalities de re, which can be interpreted 
according to different levels of abstractions by inforgs like human beings. 
Human beings are able to extract relevant information because they have minds; 
and such relevant information can be updated to knowledge when integrated 
within a coherent history. Data implies ontic differences that are epistemically 
exploitable as resources for cognitive processes. 
Reality in itself — with its intrinsic multi-level intelligibility — remains 
an epistemically inexhaustible resource out of which knowledge is formed. Of 
course objects in the world allow or invite certain epistemic constructs and resist 
or impede some others, but the ways in which one has epistemic access to the 
system affect the cognitive outcome. Knowing thus has to do with designing and 
modelling reality [28, p. 370], with a process of semanticization — coming to 
mean — of nature. The primacy of an information-laden nature is only perceived 
by minds able to extract and deal with it at different levels of abstraction. No 
ontology can be freed of the latter. Information in the Universe and mindful 
human beings are but two sides of the same coin. Both of them share an internal 
logos allowing the latter‘s cognitive access to the former. The price to be paid is 
that the question of why reality is intelligible for us has no answer within the 
pure realm of our cognitive skills. In other words, the symbol grounding 
problem might be unsolvable. 
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Presently, it is common to admit that our most fundamental scientific 
theories underdetermine reality. We see that new principles must be invoked in 
order to deal with emergent levels of complexity in CDS. If we consider reality 
as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other, complexity 
permits the emergence of cohering cluster of data waiting to be interpreted. 
Then, the evolution of the universe turns out to be a superb unfolding of sense. 
 
7.6.  The case for ontological pluralism 
 
Can we say anything more specific about the kind of emergence that 
happens in nature? Despite my last considerations, many authors continue to 
defend a mere epistemological emergence, rejecting ‗ontological levelism‘ for 
different reasons  [36, 37]. Emergence is deemed to be a relational concept in 
comparison between models. Some rule for determining an observable at one 
level is overlooked at another level for reasons of convenience about the goals 
and purposes aimed at [28, p. 64]. However, that is not the case for the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics, the wave-function collapse or the emergence of 
meaning. Neither of them stems from a coarse-grained transition from lower, 
more concrete, to upper, more abstract levels; and all of them are omnipresent in 
our scientific knowledge of reality. 
Certainly, all naïve mimetic theory or ‗picture of the world‘ view of 
knowledge must be rejected. Nature does not know about levels of abstraction, 
being designed by the epistemic agents which experience it. A constructionist 
view of knowledge is needed [28, p. 77] according to which, the selection of an 
observable to be measured locally fixes a context for the individuation of events. 
In QM, any local observable is a partial information carrier; and the totality of 
all different potential local frames ―function as a semantic tool for combining 
features under the condition of partial compatibility of observable information 
within the limits determined by the imposition of the uncertainty relations‖ [21, 
p. 364]. But it is then hard to disavow the ontological, top-down influence of 
higher levels of nature in nature via the imposition of constraints. These work 
―by modifying either a system‘s phase space or the probability distribution of 
events and movements within that space‖ [6]. The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics constrains evolution, the wave-function collapse constrains 
measurement outcomes in Hilbert space, and the relevant information constrains 
a multidimensional neural state into new patterns of activity. 
The case for ontological pluralism even becomes more evident if one 
regards specifically the symbol grounding problem. Instead of representing 
meaning in a symbol structure, ―a dynamical neurological organization 
embodies meaning in the topographical configurations — the set of self-
organized context-dependent constraints — of its phase space‖. Bottom-up 
propagation combined with top-down attentional amplification results in a 
whole-brain neural assembly and ―ignites into a self-sustained reverberant state 
of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the 
brain‖ [7]. Obviously, because of the ontology of CDS, we cannot keep track —
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in a single well-defined level — of the interplay between the system‘s own top-
down inhibiting constraints and the alternatives available to its components that 
gives rise to conscious meaningful content. As Smolin explains, the ―problem of 
qualia, or consciousness, seems unanswerable by Science because it‘s an aspect 
of the world that is not encompassed when we describe all the physical 
interactions among particles. It‘s in the domain of questions about what the 
world really is, not how it can be modelled or represented.‖ [9, p. 269]. In short, 
it is the paradigm of ontic emergence in an ontologically plural universe. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
―All the ‗fitting‘ between mathematics and the regularities of the physical 
world is done within the minds of physicists who comprehend both.‖ [38] Fair 
enough, all normativity is a construction of the human mind, but if human brain 
working is not different from any other physical or biological system, how does 
normativity stem from a universe without normativity? Somehow, normativity 
itself is beyond evolution‘s epistemic framework [39]. Science itself is beyond 
evolution‘s epistemic framework because the ―aim of Science is not just the 
manufacture of new toys: it is the enrichment of the human spirit‖ [11, p. 128]. 
Complex dynamical systems (CDS) and the three issues studied in this article —
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the quantum wave-function collapse, and 
the emergence of meaningful information — point toward an irreducible 
interplay between different levels of reality. 
CDS are partly independent of their parts, which often become 
replaceable components [6]. It is thus problematic to deny some sort of ontic 
independence for the upper levels of complexity in nature. New types of entities 
and qualitatively different regimes emerge as a result of discontinuous and 
irreversible phase transitions. With the onset of the new regime, the system top-
down constrains its lower-level behaviour. A different epistemic method is 
necessary to approach the emergent level of complexity: a redefinition of 
degrees of freedom and phase-space turns out to be inevitable. In that sense, the 
new description is level-dependent and, since it depends on human epistemic 
interest, human-dependent [16]. As Quantum Mechanics (QM) suggests, 
knowledge makes a difference in the world because logical conditioning makes 
a real difference in the world. The presence of mind — the subjective side of 
objective logos — makes a difference in nature. 
Despite some tentative of explaining the emergence of indeterminacy and 
free will via deterministic chaos [http://edge.org/conversation/free-will-
determinism-quantum-theory-and-statistical-fluctuations-a-physicists-take] and 
identifying randomness with unpredictability [40], deterministic chaos in itself is 
unable to explain the emergence of upper levels of complexity. There are 
actually different sources of determination at different levels because lower 
levels are not sufficient conditions for upper levels. It is not surprising then that 
the principle of sufficient reason must be complemented with new principles. In 
that sense, QM intrinsic indeterminism need not be equivalent to free will; it 
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simply reflects some intrinsic limitation of physics within the realm accessible to 
human freedom and spiritual determination. The QM measurement problem 
might be unsolvable. 
Evidently, there are more than clouds on the reductionist horizon and on 
the possibility that an ultimate TOE can be formulated as a finite number of 
principles [S.W. Hawking, Godel and the End of the Universe, 2002, 
http://www.hawking.org.uk/godel-and-the-end-of-physics.html]. No finite set of 
efficient causes will describe the becoming of the universe, including the mind. 
―We do not know all the possibilities in the adjacent possible of the biosphere! 
Not only do we not know what will happen, we do not even know what can 
happen.‖ [https://edge.org/conversation/five-problems-in-the-philosophy-of-
mind] Of course, science resorts to probability distributions to deal with 
unknowability, but in many cases we do not even know the set of possibilities. 
This is hardly shocking inasmuch as real novelties and differences appear in the 
Universe and new epistemic principles to approach them can be added only a 
posteriori. The alternative therefore is not between pure determinism and pure 
randomness — as, for example, the emergence of the classical world from 
decoherence illustrates. We need an a priori cognitive, specifically human 
identification of the problem — what should be the system and the environment 
and the relevant degrees of freedom — to scientifically be able to tackle it. 
Therefore, it is very doubtful that we can scientifically study the universe as a 
whole from scratch. 
In summation, we deal with different levels of reality in CDS and we need 
to invoke some novel constraints or conditions for understanding the emergence 
of upper levels from lower ones. If someone wishes to maintain a global 
microscopic determinism, the emergence of constraints — as the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, the quantum wave-function collapse, and information in non-
interpreted nature — from much more basic laws should be explained. 
Otherwise, we can maintain the view that emergence of complexity is purely 
epistemic, but if that is the case, we cannot longer trust our scientific access to 
reality. The basic realism of science and science itself are then, in my opinion, 
undermined. Tegmark is right when affirming that the ―quests to better 
understand the internal reality of our mind and the external reality of our 
universe will hopefully assist one another‖ [http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219], but 
I would spell it out better with the words of former pope Benedict XVI: 
―Mathematics, as such, is a creation of our intelligence: the correspondence 
between its structures and the real structures of the Universe — which is the 
presupposition of all modern scientific and technological developments, already 
expressly formulated by Galileo Galilei with the famous affirmation that the 
book of nature is written in mathematical language — arouses our admiration 
and raises a big question. It implies, in fact, that the Universe itself is structured 
in an intelligent manner, such that a profound correspondence exists between our 
subjective reason and the objective reason in nature. It then becomes inevitable 
to ask oneself if there might not be a single original intelligence that is the 
common font of them both.‖ [41] 
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